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focus in order to effectively provide the Army with regional and analytic expertise. The branch's current path will languish into obscurity and fail to deliver the products Army leaders need. A majority of FA34s expressed frustration over the functional area's lack of vision or purpose. This paper examines the root cause of the problem and offers recommendations to reimage the branch. At the forefront of change is a new vision and centralized approach to the apportionment and disposition of FA34s. This includes a quantitative approach to build, assign, and develop its manpower. Also key in this makeover is modeling the FA34 closely after its strategic counterpart, the Foreign Area Officer. The goal must be to establish FA34 as a complementary but distinct component to Military Intelligence. Regionalization is the single most distinguishing characteristic that separates the two. The Army's MI leadership stands at an important juncture to reshape the career field or continue the status quo. Organizational change is always hard, but the time is ripe for the FA34 career field to realize its true potential in shaping the Army's strategic direction.
Regionalization: The Cure for an Ailing Intelligence Career Field
In an era of declining budgets, you have to absolutely know what you do.
-GEN James F. Amos, 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps
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In the mid-1980s, America's automobile industry was in crisis. It was producing cars Americans didn't want, bulging with inventories, and unable to imagine a better way. Attempting to understand its slipping competitive edge to Japan, a group of U.S.
auto industry leaders took an overseas trip. They toured factories and heard lectures on managerial and manufacturing processes. They returned home, unimpressed because Japanese systems didn't look anything like American hallmarks of manufacturing success. What they missed was that the Japanese had been perfecting a "just-in-time" inventory system, dramatically reducing the need for in-process inventories throughout the manufacturing system. 2 Over time, the Japanese auto industry would force the U.S.
automobile industry to change many of their mental models in order to compete.
The Army's Military Intelligence (MI) enterprise sits in a similar position today, building products that few people want and lacking the vision to change. An element of the enterprise in particular disarray is the Army's Strategic Intelligence Officer or Functional Area 34 (FA34 for brevity). A career field originally designed to provide regional and analytic expertise; it has devolved as a bill payer for MI throughout the enterprise. In doing so, the Army has lost a critical skill, and the career field sits in disarray. As the Army's MI enterprise copes with multiple issues in this period of fiscal constraint and uncertainty, the FA34 career field can be a critical force multiplier if properly developed and organized.
2 This paper establishes that the FA34 career field must organize regionally and re-focus in order to effectively provide the Army with much needed regional and analytic expertise. The branch's current path, if left unattended, will languish in obscurity and fail to deliver unique products that appeal to Army leaders and meet the strategic challenges facing our nation.
To begin this exploration, it is important to recognize the significance of strategic intelligence. "Over the past 11 years of continuous combat, the Army made great strides at the tactical and operational level of war." 3 Abandoned in the immediacy for actionable intelligence is strategic intelligence. The Army's ability to deliver thoughtful assessments has diminished precisely when the character of modern conflict demands it most.
"Consumers may not always call for strategic intelligence, but they will always need it.
We must never neglect it." 4 Understanding the value of strategic intelligence leads to a careful examination of the root causes of an ailing discipline. These symptoms manifest themselves in arbitrary manning decisions and flawed mental models which foster confusion within the Army's intelligence leadership, making reform extremely difficult to envision. However, opportunities exist to reestablish the FA34 as the vanguard for analysis and a contributing agent for regional expertise and depth. The path to successfully build a competent cadre with upward mobility only requires a vision, for "clarity of vision and steadfastness of purpose require no funding." 5 An established vision for a FA34 will offer recommendations to shape and synchronize the career field with Army's 2020 vision.
3
These recommendations include some dramatic cultural changes within the branch. To successfully transform the FA34, the Army's MI leadership must look to a more centralized approach to the apportionment and disposition of its personnel. Also key in this makeover is the fresh look at the career field and its path for progression.
Most similar example of a "strategic intelligence analysis" is the Army's "strategic scout"
or Foreign Area Officer (FA48 These experiences are not unique within the Army. The Army relies heavily on the national intelligence enterprise for strategic insight and warning. Yet "very few employees of the IC would say they are working to advance the implementation of the official National Security Strategy…. Instead, much of today's intelligence is tactical and tangential." 9 In a survey of hundreds of intelligence community analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), the surveyed personnel offered these insights: 10 -Our products have become so specific, so tactical that our thinking has become tactical. We're losing our strategic edge because we're focused on today's issues.
-Velocity isn't a substitute for quality. We've gotten rid of the real analytic products that we used to make, and now just report on current events.
The Army, which leans heavily on the national intelligence agencies, must contend with a very inexperienced and strategically dull workforce. "One result, warned Carl W. Ford Jr., a former assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research, is that 'we haven't done strategic intelligence for so long that most of our analysts don't' know how to do it anymore." 11 
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The Army's move to a more regionally aligned force will only increase the need for strategic intelligence analysis as its wartime focus shifts to prevent, shape, and win strategies. To effectively shape an Area of Operations (AOR), a Geographic Combatant
Commander (CCDR) must accurately understand his environment and take advantage of opportunities that may be "hidden" within the larger dynamic of the strategic environment. 12 The FA34 career field is ideally suited to assist in this task.
Interestingly, the other services -Navy, Air Force, or Marines -have no equivalent to the Army's FA34 career field. Their intelligence professionals serve at strategic level assignments, often with no additional education or training. The Air Force and Navy can afford to accept risk in the area of strategic intelligence because their orientation is in the domain of sea, air and space. The Army cannot afford this luxury because it remains the dominant force in the Human Domain. 13 "Humans are interlopers in the air, on the sea, and in space; temporary occupants, maintained there through various technologies." 14 The Army stands unique among the services because it is the premier land power force deterring aggression, responding to crisis, defeating an enemy and influencing actions of others in ways that reduce the inevitable tensions of the international system. 15 The Joint Force will face actors who view the world through different lenses, and it must resist judging the world as if it operated along the same principles and values that drive America. 16 A competent strategic intelligence cadre can provide the nuanced insights required to make sense of regional areas that can rapidly become a combination of combat, governance, and civil security. 17 Unfortunately, distraction and uncertainty have limited the FA34s contributions. Shared experiences in this case are failing the FA34 and hindering its ability to provide 9 a coherent vision and direction. Some are content with the status quo and embrace the mantra "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." But it is broken, and it needs to be fixed.
Counterpoint -Status Quo Works
One may disagree and convincingly argue that ambiguity and flexibility is the strength of the FA34 career field. Promotion rates compliment this line of thought as 38 It makes sense to regionalize the FA34 for without regionalization, the Army's ability to provide superior strategic intelligence will continue to lack credibility and expertise at a time when the Joint Operating Environment guarantees greater volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity.
Perhaps the most compelling point for regionalizing the FA34 rests in the fact that the US intelligence and policy system is built around regionalization. Every national intelligence agency has regional offices to match its policy counterparts Commanders. These assignments demand intelligence competencies across the intelligence cycle. A FA34 will have spent ten years leading efforts in all phases of the cycle in order to arrive at an analytic conclusion.
Road Map for FA34 Success/ Recommendations
Keeping pace with Army's Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept, MI and the FA34 community must act with urgency to deliver a quality product by Full Operational Capability (FOC) for the RAF concept which is targeted in 2016. 41 A typical approach has little chance of affecting true transformation as legacy structures and culture often weigh down, rather than facilitate, necessary change. 42 To build a brand that enhances the Army's strategic intelligence capability requires some risk taking and departure from capability. 43 Clearly Asia and Europe offer the greatest potential for investing in strong and capable partners, a primary goal of the National Security Strategy of the United
States of America (NSS). 44 Meanwhile, Sub Saharan Africa presents the most likely area of instability. More interestingly and requiring greater study are the regions where the delta between instability and security potential are highest, for they present the greatest potential opportunities for engagement or challenges due to conflict. Using a model to frame the environment and a three-year force generation cycle allows the Army to adjust its Strategic Intelligence force in a smart and deliberate way.
No longer would the FA34 work force be determined by arbitrary data calls and skewed organizational thinking. This new process would bring a methodological approach to intelligently apportion and disposition the Army's FA34 assets. Extending this model beyond the FA34 initial entry cycle requires a bit more analysis, but it is easy to imagine a cycle between regional offices at the IC, Combatant Commands, Army Enterprise, and institution building locations.
Recruit Smartly, Assess Accordingly
Regionalization and smart allocation would, in turn, drive better recruitment and career management. As MI builds its calculated outlook on regional affairs, the proponent and Human Resource (HR) have at their disposal an opportunity to shape the FA34 population to meet those needs. Today, the Army accesses FA34s into the career field based primarily on the officer's strength of file and willingness to volunteer.
It is a "push" system, where candidates apply, get screened and fill billets; few opportunities exist to "pull" from the Army inventory. However, if the FA34 is regionalized, it provides HR flexibility to actually pull talent from the Army and aggressively target officers with unique regional experience, interagency knowledge, Concerns that regionalization will confound recruiting and limit the assignments process, deserves some mention. Since the FA34 population is considerably smaller than the FA48 (almost 1/5 the size), 48 FA34 must take a border approach to its areas of concentration in order to maintain flexibility in the system. FA48 trains, develops and assigns its officers to support nine areas of concentration based on the historical cultural centers of the world. The HR effort within FA48 also saddled with recruiting and assignment challenges manages the process fairly well. Adjusting the FA34 regional focus to five areas, which incidentally matches the number of DoD Regional Centers for Security Study, 49 maintains a proportionately manageable manpower pool for recruiting and assignments. Furthermore, focusing the effort on five regions provides more flexibility and greater opportunity to maneuver without losing regional expertise.
FA48s Provide an Instructive Model for Integration and Employment
FA48 career field is a model to closely follow. The advertised FA34 officer is part of the "strategic triumvirate" of FA34, FA48 and FA59 (Strategist) that provide dedicated strategic plans, intelligence and area expertise to the Army. 50 If the FA48 is the strategic scout, then the FA34 is the strategic analyst who works in conjunction with the scout. A powerful force multiplier, the FA48 has successfully built its brand and competencies.
The demand for FA48 officers often exceeds the functional area's capacity to generate new recruits and remains one of the few growth areas within the Army. 51 The FA48 bins its workforce into five main areas to build expertise and credentials. 52 With modifications, these five areas may serve as the model for developing, assigning and building a competent FA34 cadre. Concerns that FA34 will become a manpower pool for the interagency should not worry Army leaders. Creative solutions exist which may align the officer with a CCMD, while at duty in the national enterprise. Ideally, an officer would serve at a national enterprise while under the direction of a CCMD. His tasking and producing would be driven by the CCMD using national expertise. It would be a win-win situation. The national system wins because reporting and production stay steady or increase while they also undergo reductions. Likewise, the Army wins because its assets are focused on leveraging national capabilities to generate relevant intelligence.
Country Team
The an experience is seldom at the mercy of a man with an argument." 54 The experience only strengthens the FA34s ability to appreciate the environment and provide the depth and breadth so missing in the Army's analytic enterprise.
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The RCSS are vital to the FA34 field because they are designed as the Secretary of Defense's "study of security issues relating to a specified geographic region of the The difference between education and training is subtle but important. "In the simplest terms, training is the process of skills acquisition, while education is the process of knowledge acquisition." 57 The Army spends a considerable amount of time teaching soldiers repeatable processes to a recognizable standard. It's important that the soldier understands the standard operating procedures associated with the production of the common operating picture, the short term assessment, and the daily activity report. Often neglected are those skills needed to critically evaluate sources and effectively use the information for understanding or meaning. Education is the "critical thinking and reasoning skills necessary to synthesize and integrate knowledge." They must have opportunities to lead and deploy in appropriate capacities. FA34s can certainly lead combined and joint intelligence organizations, but they can also serve as the nucleus of any strategic-level advisory group. Lessons learned from advisory groups deployed to Iraq depict a process forged through trial and error. Some documented shortfalls expressed during the Iraq experience included: a lack of cultural awareness, understanding of the intelligence community, analytic tradecraft shortfalls, and subject matter expertise. 59 Clearly, the FA34 community should play an integral role in any partner intelligence advising assistance efforts. Since the Army's vision includes greater partner security assistance, the FA34 cadre assigned at USAICoE would be ideally suited to facilitate doctrine development in the intelligence advisory group and shape a deployability concept.
Unconventional Skill Development -Energize the Force
To become that ultimate ingredient, like the Intel chip, the FA34 will need to embrace skill sets that do not resonate well in the MI community. Building a historical practitioners mind will aide in understanding current trends in proper perspective.
Acquiring the knowledge of librarians puts sources such as the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, which has: up-to-date subject indexes of congressional documents, social science publications, statistics, laws, and biographical directories, at the finger tips of the strategic analyst. 60 The student of research techniques subscribes to the principles in The Modern Researcher, by Jacquess Barzun and Henry Graff. 61 Developing these skills will require some nontraditional thought and investment. MG 
